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Introduction
The legality of the invasion of Iraq is a vital question that goes to the heart of international
law. The proper legal authority for military force and the overthrow of a sovereign government
is the single most important area of international law.1 This paper will consider whether the
invasion of Iraq complied with the original intent of the Founding Fathers for the Constitutional
authority to wage war and satisfied the requirements for a Just War under natural law.
The Declaration of Independence founded the American Republic on natural law and the
Constitution rests on the principles of the Declaration. Natural law requires that war must be
both a Just War and it should conform to the standards of Jus ad Bellum. The Founding Fathers
embraced the ideas of Just War and Jus ad Bellum.2
Imperial Presidential Power, the American Constitution, and International Law
The Bush administration adopted an expansive view of presidential power to justify the use
of force based on only a resolution and not the Constitutional requirements for a declared war.
Neither the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Force against Iraq nor United Nations
Resolution 1441 authorization the overthrow of the government of Iraq and the occupation of
Iraq. President Bush based his claim to have the authority to overthrow the government of Iraq
and to occupy Iraq on the idea that Commander in Chief authority to use force was nearly
unlimited.
The Bush administration claimed that a president is not bound by customary international
law and that in military actions the president is not bound at all by international law. The
Founding Fathers of America believed that Presidents must uphold treaties and customary
international law. Three advisory attorney general opinions and thirty federal cases including
fifteen Supreme Court cases held that Presidents are bound by customary law.3
The heart of the Bush administration argument was that Article 2 of the Constitution giving
the President control of Executive power and making the President Commander in Chief of the
military meant that the President had unlimited authority to initiate the use of force.4 However,
the Founding Fathers recognized a prerogative of superintendence for the President as
Commander in Chief. The President retains military discretion while Congress had board
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authority to regulate the military and the President’s conduct of war. 5 Congress alone could
take the nation to war through a Declaration of War6
The Constitution took away the power of Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, to
appoint and remove the commander in chief of the military. Proponents of the Unitary
Executive theory cite this in support of imperial presidential power. The Founding Fathers
intended nothing of the kind. The designation of the civilian executive as the Commander of
Chief was also designed to ensure the military operated under the rule of law and the authority of
both the President and Congress.7
The Founding Fathers Intent for Presidential Authority
Presidential authority was largely shaped by the conduct of George Washington as
Commander in Chief during the Revolutionary. The Presidency was created with the
assumption that George Washington would be the first President. The remarkable
restrain of Washington in the exercise of power created a trust in Washington which
facilitated the creation of a Chief Executive office that might not have been able to
be agreed upon otherwise. 8
The term “Commander in Chief” derives from t he English Civil War. Parliament
appointed Sir Thomas Fairfax t o be commander in chief of its forces, “subject to such
orders and directions as he shall receive from Houses or from the Committee of both
Kingdoms.”9 The commander in chief could not act against the will of the Parliament. He
also was instructed, "to observe and obey such orders and directions as you shall from time to
time receive from the Parliament.”10
Washington was appointed Commander in Chief of the Continental Army
unmistakably established as an agent of the Continental Congress. On June 17, 1775, the
Continental Congress designated W ashington both “General and Commander in chief, of
the army of the United Colonies.”11 Continental Congress specifically required him to
conform his conduct “in every respect by the rules and discipline of war,” and directed him
“punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall
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receive from this, or a future Congress of these United Colonies, or committee of Congress.”12
The text does not specifically enumerate the Commander in Chief’s powers. In contrast, the
text of Article I contains several express references to the congressional role concerning the
army, navy, and militia, including specific war powers.13 A statutory directive or limitation is
in and of itself a “command” to the armed forces. 14 Thus, the Commander in Chief Clause
cannot properly be construed to give the President unlimited power to take the nation to war.
The Founding Fathers built in a conflict between the authority of the President and Congress to
guard against the abuse of power.15
By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the title “Commander in Chief”
had become identified with the de facto authority possessed by Washington in later stages
of the war.16 Washington’s authority was primarily delegated to him rather than being
“inherent” war powers of the Commander in Chief.17 Hamilton wrote that the
Commander in Chief’s authority “would be nominally the same with that of the king of
Great Britain” but that authority would be in substance much inferior to it. ‘It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first
general and admiral of the C onfederacy; while that of the British King extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies all which would
subject to the regulation of the legislature.’18
Further, during the Constitutional Convention was no recorded discussion or debate
suggesting any change in the authority the President would hold versus that George Washington
held as Commander in Chief.19 Hamilton explained that, at most, the Commander in Chief
would have those powers enjoyed by the governors of Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
Hamilton thought, “it may well be a question” whether the constitutions of those states
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“confer[red] larger powers”). The state constitutions mandated that the commander in chief’s
powers were “to be exercised agreeably to the rules and regulations o f the constitution, and
the laws of the land… .”21
Defenders of a strong preclusive executive prerogative over the conduct of military
operations often augment their claims with passages from Hamilton’s Federalist essays in
which he discusses the need for energy in the Executive, including 69 and 74.22 Hamilton
discussed the prosecution of war: “Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a
23
single hand.”
Advocates of Presidential Prerogative cite Hamilton’s discussion of a “single hand.”
Hamilton was arguing that Congress could not regulate the Commander in Chief nor was
he referencing the authority to take the nation to. Hamilton was explaining why the
move for a plural executive had been rejected. A three-man executive along the lines of
the Trivium of the Roman Republic had been proposed and rejected. Hamilton was
defending the Constitution against Anti-Federalists who opposed a single executive.24
The Founding Fathers of America were intentionally rejecting the British model of executive
prerogative. They saw President as Commander in Chief who lacked the power to take the
nation to war. Only Congress could take the nation to war and even then Congress needed to
declare war and accept responsibility for taking the nation to war.25
The international norms of immediate self-defense allow a President to act to protect against
an attack. The Founding Fathers intended that both the President and Congress should act in
good faith toward treaty obligations and comply with international norms unless they conflicted
with American values or natural law. Natural Law as the expression of God's law was seen as
the ultimate governing light.26
The Founding Fathers of America were repulsed by the endless wars of European monarchs
and wanted to prevent a President from waging war against the will of the people. Thus, an
originalist view of the Constitution requires a President to receive authority from Congress either
20
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directly or indirectly through a self-executing treaty like the NATO or immediate national selfdefense to use military force.
Just War and the Iraq Invasion
In the fifth century, Saint Augustine of Hippo created the term "Just War" in his book the City
of God. Augustine argued the general position of Christians is to advocate peace and to only go
to war as last resort. Augustine was focused on self-defense and the defense of others. Also,
Augustine argued that the war must be initiated by proper authority. Further, believers should
humbly remember they are men and to seek the will of God and sure the war is just before going
to war.27
In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas further developed Augustine’s Just War idea by
codifying the standards for Just War. First, the war had to be waged by proper authority and that
authority had to lawfully enact the decision to go to war. Second, the war had to be waged for a
just and good purpose and not for selfish gain. Aquinas rejected mere national interest or to
wield power.28
The just purpose has to be such as to regain lost land, protect the people, and correct an evil
done. However, war should only be conducted if there is no alternative peaceful solution. Thus,
the purpose of the war should certain on protecting the people rather than serving the interests of
the leaders. Third, the central motive for war must be to restore and protect the peace. Political
agendas carried out by war would all be unjust.29
The Iraq War fails the Just War requirements of Augustine and Aquinas. The invasion of Iraq
was not conducted in immediate self-defense or defense of others. The war was not conducted
as the last restore but rather the Bush Administration was determined to invade Iraq.30 Further,
the purpose of the Iraq War is questionable. If the war was truly fought over weapons of mass
destruction then it was unjust because the factual basis was an error. The real motive was a
hidden political agenda then the war falls completely out of all just war bounds.31
Aquinas added that the war must not just by a proper authority but that authority must declare
the war and reach that declaration through the proper deliberations. These additional factors add
additional problems with the justness of the Iraq invasion. The Bush Administration did not
follow the constitutional requirement of a Declaration of War.32
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The Bush Administration realized it had little hope of getting declaration of war and the Bush
administration did not want to concede that Congress was the branch of government which takes
the nation to war. Instead, by a simple majority vote, a limited authorization to use force was
passed. However, even then the authorization did not give authority to overthrow the
government of Iraq and occupy the nation. The Bush administration proceeded on with its plans
to overthrow the Iraqi government with no regard for the limits of the authorization.33
The Bush Administration's intention to both overthrow the Iraq government and to occupy
Iraq was publicly stated. Congressional joined with the Bush Administration to work around the
constitution with a resolution. Congress sought to avoid responsibility but only approving
limited military action. However, Congress understood the Bush Administration's intentions and
is equally culpable of waging an unjust war.34
Just War developed over the last few centuries and produced a general consensus among
Christians emerged called “Jus ad bellum.” Jus ad bellum became the standard customary law
for waging just war among Western nations and this has become the general international
customary law. Jus ad bellum sets forth seven basic factors to determine if war is justified.35
The first factor is that the war must be waged for a just cause. The war must not for selfish
gain or even to restore a wrong or punish evil. The war must be in defense of the nation or
others and must be necessary to protect life. The second factor is comparative justice is served
by war. The presumption must be against war. The basis for the war must be great enough to
offset the suffering which will be caused by the war.36
The third factor is that only a competent public authority can wage a war. Not only must it
be a government or international body but there must be a system of law in place which allows
for a proper determination of the justness of the war. Thus, dictators taking their nations to war
through a personal will is unjust. A republic must follow its own laws and procedures. The war
should be congressionally declared.37
The fourth factor is right intention. Right intention goes to motivation for the war. The just
cause must not just be a pretext but the real reason for the war. The fifth factor is probably of
success. The war must not a senseless fight that can only harm such as the Jewish rebellion
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against the Romans in the first century. The war brought about the destruction of Jerusalem and
devastation to the Jewish community and never had a real chance of success.38
The sixth factor is last resort, which harkens back to Augustine's standard that peace is the
normative stance. All reasonable alternatives to war must be pursued and must fail before
seeking war. The final factor is proportionality, which is that the positive gain which can be
expected from war outweighs the great costs of war. World War I would be an example where
the great costs made joining the war unjust.39
The Iraq invasion was not truly done for a just cause. The invasion was not in defense of any
nation but rather with the intent of "nation-building" by turning Iraq into a democracy. Such a
motive gives the appearance of a just cause. No nation has the right to "nation-build" another
country to shape that nation in its own image. Each nation must be allowed to find its own way
as long as it does not harm other nations.40
Comparative justice was not served by the invasion. There was no urgent need for the
invasion of Iraq. Iraq’s military was weak and did not pose a real threat. The invasion resulted
in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis during the invasion and the occupation. Iraq was
plunged into instability which may continue for decades. It was foreseeable that the harm from
the invasion would be great.41
The right intention cannot be fully judged at this point in history. The record is unclear if the
publicly announced reasons for war, Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, terrorism, and
the Iraq government’s abuse of its people, were the real reasons for the war. The Bush
administration appeared to be determined to invade no matter what the evidence indicated and
regardless of any legal limits. Thus, the intentions of the Bush administration are suspect. 42
The invasion of Iraq was waged with a high probability of successfully defeating the Iraqi
military and overthrowing the government. The military outcome was never in doubt.
However, the national building aspirations of the Bush administration were dubious at best. The
Bush administration entirely failed to recognize that Iraq lacked the social, cultural, and legal
foundations for a functional democracy.43
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The Iraq invasion fails the test of exhausting reasonable alternatives to war. The Bush
administration was determined to invade Iraq and resisted efforts to resume United Nations
weapon inspections. No real effort was made for a peaceful solution by the Bush administration
desperately searched for excuses to attack Iraq and used alternating and inconsistent legal
justifications.44
The invasion of Iraq also strongly fails the test of proportionality. The invasion was
motivated by the 9-11 attack and the menace of terrorism and radical Islam. The government of
Iraq was repressive but it was a secular regime. The focus of the civilized world needed to be on
combating the rise of radical Islam. Saddam Hussein harshly repressive radical Islamists within
Iraq. The very idea of overthrowing any secular regime in the Islamic world is a foolish
response to the rise of radical Islam.45
The invasion of Iraq fueled the rise of radicals both within Iraq and around the Islamic world.
It should have been no surprise that a Western lead invasion and overthrow of a secular Muslim
government in the Middle East would destabilize the region and fuel the rise of radical Islam.
The invasion and continual conflict to this day have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
thousands of civilians. The American military warned the civilian leadership that the civilian
causalities could be great and was ignored.46
The Bush administration ignored the clear and present dangers of the invasion of Iraq. The
rest of the coalition went along failing to seriously continue the merits and perils of the invasion.
The Bush administration sold the war with suggestions that the war would for itself, that the war
would be clean thanks to modern high teach weapons resulting in few civilian causalities.
Likewise, the coalition deaths would small not the thousands who died in reality. The Bush
administration even promised a functional democracy for Iraq. No serious evaluation of the
climate of Iraq would have supported such claims.47
The invasion of Iraq fails the test of the Jus ad bellum factors. The war was not just and
improperly conducted without a Declaration of War. The mere fact that the Iraq government
was repressive was not a justification for the war. Many nations across the globe are repressive
and the United States nor the United Nations cannot reasonably invade and overthrow their
government. The war is a lesson that peace should be the normative standard. Military force
should only be used within the original Constitutional and natural law just war limits.
Legal Legacy of the Iraq Invasion
The high cost in money and lives and lack of concert successes turned American public
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opinion against the Iraq War. President Obama made opposition to the Iraq Invasion and Bush’s
Imperial Presidency claims centerpieces of his Presidential campaign. However, upon taking
office Obama quickly built on the legacy of Bush and made even broader claims of Presidential
authority.48
In March 2011, Obama made the dramatic claim to having authority to use military force in
Libya with no congressional authorization and no claim of self-defense nor treaty obligation. No
American President had ever claimed such broad authority to take the nation to war. Obama was
in effect claiming to have the same authority as that of King George. Obama justified his actions
on the basis that he had the constitutional authority to “reasonably determine that the use of
military force in the national interest and no congressional approval was required for limited
military operations.49
On 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 which
authorized enforcement of a "no-fly zone" over large parts of Libya to protect the refugees of the
civil war. The resolution did not authorize the overthrow of the Libyan regime nor active
military intervention on any side in the civil war. However, the Obama administration’s
intentions were openly to remove the government of Libya.50
The United Nations articles did not authorize the United Nations to intervene in an internal
conflict to overthrow the government. However, President Obama openly treated Resolution
1973 as an authorized limited military to overthrow the Libya government to protect civilians.
Like President Bush, Obama was going beyond any authority he had received and had no regard
for international law or constitutional restrictions on his authority to use military force.51
The government of Libya was overthrown by insurgents with the active military intervention
of the United States military and some of its NATO allies. Obama's arguments built on the
legacy of Bush's invasion of Iraq. Obama like Bush focused on the evil nature of the regime and
the need to aid the civilian population suffering from dictatorship. Obama actually went further
in the humanitarian intervention because unlike Bush, he did not claim that the national security
of the United States was in danger. Bush sought at least partial Congressional authorization
while Obama sought no Congressional authorization.52
Congress protested but did nothing. Therefore, the precedent is in place which allows for
military intervention in another nation solely on the authority of the President to protect the
civilian population. Obama set the precedent that even the overthrow of another nation’s
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government was permitted. The Founding Fathers, customary law, the United Nations Charter,
natural war, and Just War doctrine all oppose such a broad authority to wage war.
The true justification for the Imperial Presidential use of force by Presidents Bush and
Obama is found in the 19th-century German school of Philosophy. George Hegel wrote that the
state was a metaphysical reality not subject to objective outside restrains such as natural law.
Rather, the state had the right to choose between following or disrespecting a law. Thus, a
President could take the nation to war because the President deems it necessary regardless of any
legal restrains.53
Traditional Jus ad Bellum Provides the Best Guidance
The rejection of jus ad bellum has been a complete failure on all fronts and contributed to the
United States' misguided foreign policy. The invasion of Iraq cost many lives and tremendous
amounts of money and did not make the United States or the World safer and Iraq remains
unstable and troubled. Jus Ad Bellum would have guided America to not go forward with the
invasion. Time-tested jus ad bellum would help restore a lawful national security policy for the
United States and set a positive standard for the world to follow.
Jus ad bellum would halt the impulsive military actions and restore a responsible use of
force. Presidents would no longer launch military strikes unless required by immediate selfdefense or authorized by Congress or by Treaty obligation. The use of force would after careful
consideration of all factors and exhausting all alternatives.54
The application of jus ad bellum would have prevented the reckless American lead invasion
of Iraq which was carried out without exhausting alternatives, in the absence of self-defense, and
lacking a truly just cause. A secular regime would have remained in place preventing the spread
of radical Islam to Iraq. The military intervention into Libya would likewise have been avoided
since no self-defense requirement was involved and the intervention lacked proper authority.
The drone strikes, airstrikes, and special-forces operations would be conducted only with
congressional authorization and either with a declaration of war or permission by the local
government. Such guidance would contribute to clear military objectives and strategic
planning.55
Jus ad bellum provides the authority for a rapid response to immunity threat or a cyberattack. A truly imminent attack can be dealt with through self-defense authority. Such selfdefense authority should not be twisted so that hypothetical dangers as used as a pretext for the
overthrow of a government and the occupation of a nation. The modern threats do not call for
abandoning jus ad bellum. Rather a careful application of the principles of jus ad bellum needs
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to be made to modern threats.56
Jus ad bellum principles reflect the collective wisdom of centuries and served as the proper
guide for modern problems. Policymakers have recklessly disregarded this guidance from
history and the deep thought of countless scholars. The use of force must be guided and
controlled by a standard that enables necessary military force but restrains the abuse of power
and unjust force.57
The restoration of jus ad bellum aids in restoring the sound rule of law to the struggle against
terrorism and other modern threats. One of the greatest casualties of the departure from jus ad
bellum has been the deterioration of compliance with the rule of law in the name of fighting
terrorism. Such a decline is unnecessary and does make the world safer. Jus ad bellum
principles can make the world safer.58
Conclusion
The invasion and occupation of Iraq violated the principles of Just War. The Bush
administration had no regard for the principles of Just War nor the Constitutional limits of
Presidential power to use military force. Jus ad bellum has come into disfavor and disuse.
However, western governments have generally dismissed jus ad bellum principles without a
serious policy or legal debate. Jus ad bellum is still relevant to the modern era and the war on
global terrorism. A proper application of the principles is required to obtain the proper legal and
policy guidance. The principles of jus ad bellum are vital for putting American foreign and
national security policy on a sound course.
The United States and Coalition Partners' invasion of Iraq, overthrown of its internationally
recognized regime, and occupation of Iraq violated international law. The United States violated
norms governing the use of force and overthrow of a sovereign state. Resolution 1441 was
passed with weak factual support. The United States and partner nations' overthrow of the Iraq
government and occupation of Iraq was not authorized by Resolution 1441.
The United States' actions violated its own Constitution which meant it could have not
possibly complied with international law when its actions violated its own law. The actions of
the United States government violated international law and were injurious to the Rule of Law.
The greatest harm from the illegal invasion of Iraq is that undermined the American Republic
and set a dangerous precedent that America has yet to address.
Just War principles have been challenged as archaic in a world troubled by global terrorism
and cyber warfare. Neo-Conservatives and other foreign policy establishment types argue that
56
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jus ad bellum principles must be abandoned to save civilization from terrorism. The ideology of
both the Democrat and Republican establishments holds that global terrorism requires the ability
to strike anywhere in the world regardless of whether the sovereign nation has permitted for the
use of military force.
Jus ad bellum guidance needs to be properly applied to the use of military force in general
and in particular the war on terrorism. The disregard for jus ad bellum has undermined jus ad
bello principles. The disregard for traditional Jus ad bellum has left American foreign policy
adrift and fighting wars without even a plan for victory. A proper application of jus ad bellum
would help restore a sound legal and policy footing for fighting terrorism and the modern threat.
Also, it would aid in upholding jus ad bellum along with jus post bellum principles.
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